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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELROY WULFENSTEIN,
H O W A R D H . C A R T E R and
JOHN WHITNEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

f

Case No.
13617

E L L I S L A R S O N and
ORA H . L A R S O N , his wife,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

N A T U R E OF CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of
Specific Performance entered in the above entitled case
in favor of the plaintiffs. I t was found that the defendants did sign an option for the sale of realty, and the
plaintiffs exercised the option properly and were entitled to have the same performed.
1
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DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable J . Harlan
Burns, District Judge, on the 29th day of October,
1973. H e awarded judgment and a decree of specific
performance in favor of plaintiffs. H e ordered performance of the option for purchase of realty, with a
finding that the option had been exercised in accordance
with the terms thereof.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Defendants seek to have this Court set aside the
decree of specific performance and by this response, Respondent seeks that the decree of the lower court be
affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We must supplement the Statement in Appellant's
brief so the Court will have a more complete understanding of the facts in evidence which relate to the
issues.
The option is for 1040 acres of ranch land for
$100,000.00. Five Hundred Dollars (Exh P-2) was
paid down when the option was signed and retained by
defendants. The first payment of $10,000.00 was tendered into escrow as scheduled. The facts surrounding
the exercise of the option are the basic issues before the
Court in this appeal. The Option (Exh P-l) is dated
2
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March 8, 1971, and required exercise "at any time before March 8, 1972 at 5 o'clock P.M." This was exercised by deposit of $10,000.00 in escrow, as required, on
March 4 at Southern Utah Title Company, and sending a written notice to defendants by certified mail.
The letter of exercise of the Option (Exh P-3) is
dated March 4, 1972, and attached thereto is the Receipt for certified mail, showing its deposit in the St.
George Post Office, certified mail, properly addressed
to the defendants, on March 6, 1972, two days before
the end of the Option. March 6, 1972 was a Monday.
Exh P-4 is a copy of the Post Office form, Notice
of Attempted Delivery left at the defendants' home on
March 7, 1972, and receipt of the envelope March 13,
1972. The testimony of the Postmaster was that the
certified mail communication was duly received on Monday, March 6, and the delivery was attempted on March
7. As the defendants were not at home, the notice (Exh
P-4) was left at their home. The defendants did not
come to the Post Office to pick up the envelope until
March 13. Obviously the defendants had received the
notice, as it was taken to the post office on the 13th, and
defendant Ellis Larson signed for the envelope at that
time. Receipt of the Notice of Attempted Delivery on
March 7 was not denied by defendants. They were not
at home when the postman came by, and elected not to
go to the post office until the next week and pick up
the letter of exercise of the option. Defendants did not
go to Southern Utah Title Company and pick up the
3
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check for $10,000.00 out of the escrow, nor submit the
Uniform Real Estate Contract as required, but advised
plaintiffs that it was too late.
On the issue of the execution of the Option and the
alleged changes, appellants' statement of facts fails to
make mention of the undenied fact that the appellants
had a copy of the Option for nearly a year before the
exercise of the option, and had made no complaint about
its contents. In fact, Exh D-l is the copy of such Option
which the Larsons had received by mail after it was notarized, and which they held from March, 1971, and it is
complete. Apparently hoping to get more money, Ellis
Larson had gone to Mr. Wulf enstein's home in December, 1971 to talk about a change in the payment schedule, a thing which he would not have done if he had not
known of the contents of the Option at that time. No
claim was made of an unauthorized filling in when they
met in December, 1971.
The only change in the document was the one made
at the time of signing, when the number of acres was
reduced by writing over the typed figures of 1140 acres,
the figures 1040, in ink, and Mr. Wulfenstein then
wrote beside it his first name, "Elroy," to reflect that
he acceded to the reduction of the acreage. There was
no reason for the Larsons to initial this, as it was a reduction of the acreage being subjected to the Option.
The option is a printed form which requires, "This
option shall be exercised by notification in writing to
the Party of the First Part." No alteration of this part
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of the form was made by either party. Appellants did
not alter this to require hand delivery or any specific
method of transmission of the writing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
OPTION WAS EXERCISED W I T H I N T H E
TIME AND IN T H E MANNER ALLOWED
BYLAW.
The printed Option form used by the parties is
silent as to the method of transmittal of the "notification
in writing." I t establishes Southern Utah Title Company as the "Escrow Agent" and directs the procedure
for disbursement of the funds that were deposited at the
time of the exercise of the option. The $10,000.00 was
deposited on or prior to March 4, 1972, the same date
as the letter of notification of exercise of the option—
four days prior to the expiration date.
I t is to be observed that in the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge J . Harlan Burns (R 91-96) he
emphasizes that the copy of the Option (after notarization by Mr. Howard Carter of Southern Utah Title
Company) was mailed to the Larsons. Mr. Larson says
that he received such by mail and put it away. Thus a
course of communication was established and accepted
by the parties at the inception. I t therefore was not unusual, when the $10,000.00 was deposited with the
escrow agent, for the written notification of exercise of
the option to be given by U.S. mail.
5
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Because of the deadline set forth in the Option of
5:00 P.M. March 8,1972, this was sent by certified mail
on March 6, and delivery was attempted on March 7,
with written notification being left at the Larsons' home
on March 7. Defendants have not explained why they
did not pick up the envelope the next day. They have
emphasized the nearness to the post office and the office
of Southern Utah Title Company. The only assumption
that can be made is that defendants imagined that by
perversely delaying the pick-up of the letter until after
the 8th, the option would lapse.
As the trial court has said in his Memorandum,
The pivitol issue raised by the facts found and
above recited by the court, is one of whether or
not the mailing of the notice 48 hours prior and
the attempted delivery by postal authorities one
24 hour period prior to the date in time the option
expired, was sufficient notice of acceptance to
mature the option contract under the law of this
state.
I t is to be observed that the plaintiff had made a timely
deposit of the $10,000.00 in escrow as required by the
option, and had mailed the notice of exercise of the option in a timely manner. Any delay in receipt thereof
was solely the result of the acts of the defendants in
attempting to defeat the option itself. Their motivation
is obvious in their resistance to the completion of the
transaction and their refusals which have made necessary this present litigation.
The mailing of the exercise of the option, coupled
6
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with the affirmative step of depositing the $10,000.00 in
escrow in a timely manner, was an effective act constituting acceptance of the offer of sale, which would
be a legal characterization of an option. The prior conduct of the parties in transmitting the original option to
the defendants by U.S. mail, without any objection or
protest by the defendants, indicates the fact that no
other method of communication was intended, designated or required by the option. The defendants emphasized the fact that St. George is not a large community and that the residence of the defendants was not
far removed from either the office of the Southern Utah
Title Company or the U.S. Post Office, or for that
matter very far from the residence of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this, an orderly and responsible proceeding for giving "written notification," as required by the
option, is by certified mail deposited with the U.S. postal authorities.
The testimony of the postmaster established the
diligent manner in which they received the written notification, as evidenced by the stamp on the receipt given
at the time that the fee for the certified mail was paid,
the notification given on the following date of the attempted delivery and advising the defendants to come
to the post office and pick up the certified mail communication, and the safe keeping of the same until the
defendants did come to the post office and sign for the
document. The only excuse (and we believe a rather
lame excuse) that was given by the defendant, Ellis
Larson, for not picking up the notification earlier, was
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that he was "too busy." If he was really that busy, it
would have been fruitless for the plaintiffs to attempt
hand-delivery to him at his residence, and they used the
only practical and realistic method available, namely the
U.S. postal service.
There is some split in authority as to whether or
not the deposit of the notification in the mail is the critical factor, or whether the actual receipt of the notification is essential, before the option has been exercised.
W e know of nothing in the state of Utah that would
negative the use of U.S. mails for the giving of a "written notification." W e would assume that it has been the
experience of all that most written communications are
made by the use of the mails, rather than by hand delivery or through the engagement of an independent
courrier.
In Morello v. Growers Grape Products Association, 186 P . 2d 463, it is held that the contract is complete when a letter of acceptance is posted, absent any
provision in the offer requiring the letter of acceptance
to be received. This appears to be a rule recognizing the
realities of life that such is a common and generally accepted procedure. In our present case the parties themselves had more or less established this method of communication, as the written option was taken to the office
of Mr. Howard Carter for notarization; he called the
defendants on the telephone to verify their signing of
the same, and then performed the notarization (a
method which the trial court felt to be less than desir8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

able) and then mailed the copy to the defendant. The
defendant Ellis Larson put it away and made no objection to that method of transmittal of the option itself.
Had the defendants desired that there should be
placed in their hands and received by them the letter of
notification, they could have inserted such into the contract prior to signing, but such was not deemed essential,
apparently, by them, or of any critical nature, or perhaps it was not even considered by them at the time of
the signing of the option. It is to be observed that this
was a printed form and the delict of specifying the
method of transmittal is not to be blameworthy toward
either party who has signed the document. The testimony in the record shows that the blanks were filled out
by Mr. Howard Carter of Southern Utah Title Company, at the instance and request of the plaintiff, so as
to the typewritten portion if there were ambiguities or
uncertainties such might be attributable to the plaintiff.
But no such contention is made and no such ambiguities
exist in the typewritten portion of the document.
In 17 Am. Jur. 2nd Supp. page 27, we have two
citations which affirm on a rather current basis the trend
of the courts toward the position that the mailing of the
exercise of the option or the acceptance of the offer in
regular manner with the postal authorities, constitutes
the acceptance itself.
Where a letter confirming exercise of option
to purchase was mailed within the period of option, it constituted the valid acceptance of the
offer under the terms of the option, even though
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the letter was received after the period had expired. R e Crossman's Estate, 231 Cal. App. 2d.
270, 41 Cal. Rptr. 800.
The well-established rule is that in the absence
of any limitation or provision to the contrary in
the offer, acceptance of an offer is complete and
the contract becomes binding upon those parties
when the offeree deposits acceptance in the post
box. Reserve Insurance Company v. D<weketty
249 Maryland, 108, 238 A. 2d. 536.
What really is happening is that the defendants are
trying to impose into the contract new terms and conditions by their own construction of the contract and by
their own testimony, namely that there had to be a written notification of the exercise of the option delivered
to them prior to the expiration date. In a recent decision
by your court, E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency,
Inc. v. Broderick, April 30, 1974, the court construed a
listing agreement between a vendor and a realtor.
Though the issues are not the same, the holding is significant and in line with the prior decisions of this court,
namely that by defendants' self-serving oral declarations and self-serving construction, the written contract
between the parties may not be altered or changed.
. . . However,, under the general rule, which is
applicable here, parol evidence may not be given
to change the terms of a written agreement
which are clear, definite and unambiguous. To
permit that would be to cast doubt upon the integrity of all contracts and to leave a party to a
solemn agreement at the mercy of the uncertainties of oral testimony given by one who in the
10
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subsequent light of events discovers he has made
a bad bargain.
Written words can be examined so as to ascertain what they stand for in connection with particular conduct or particular objects. Thus expressions of the parties prior to and contemporaneous with the execution of the written instrument may be helpful in understanding the meaning of the language used. However, the defendant here does not seek to explain the meaning as
a paragraph. H e simply wants the court to eliminate it in its entirety. This the courts cannot do.
Thus we believe that this court will agree with the
decision of Judge Burns, namely that in light of the
absence of any specifics in the printed option form as to
how the written notification should be given, that the
conduct of the parties theretofore in having the option
delivered within St. George by U.S. mail is consistent
with the conduct of the buyer in exercising the option
and giving written notification, after the deposit of the
$10,000.00 in the escrow created by the option, likewise
by use of the U.S. postal facilities. The utilization of
certified mail was a further step in attempting to assure
that the purchaser had a record of when the document
was deposited with the post office, two days prior to the
expiration of the option date.
Some point is made in the brief of the appellant
under Point I I that the option was plaintiffs' document
and was not interpreted against them by the trial court.
This seems a very unusual assertion, in that the area that
is in dispute, namely the method of transmittal of the
11
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written notification of the exercise of the option, is a
part of a printed document, a form that has been used
by many people in the community and in many other
areas, and is not something unique to plaintiff, though
plaintiff did supply the document for execution by th^
parties. The printed form was used and the dispute does
not relate to the portions that are filled in, as such is not
an element that would call for any construction or interpretation against the plaintiffs. H a d the typed-in portions of the contract been ambiguous, conflicting or uncertain, then perhaps parol evidence could have been
adduced by the parties to clarify the same, and had a
difficult ambiguity still remained, then the court would
have a duty to construe the same against the drafter
thereof. No attempt was made in the course of the trial
to impose this upon the court, and the court wisely ascertained that this was not the type ambiguity that called
for an adverse construction contrary to the evidence and
the postal records.

POINT II
O P T I O N W A S N O T V O I D AND NO A L T E R A T I O N S W E R E M A D E C O N T R A R Y TO I N STRUCTIONS.
This whole segment of the case appears to be predicated upon the hypothesis that the document was not
completed at the time of signing, and that thereafter it
was filled in contrary to instructions other than the authorization given by the defendants. It is to be observed
12
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that the references made in the brief dwell on the visit
made by Mr. Larson to Mr. Wulfenstein around
Christmas, some nine months after the time of the signing of the option and the delivery of the copy of the option to the Larsons. Apparently it was getting toward
the end of the year and Mr. Larson was reviewing his
tax problems, had re-evaluated whether he wanted to
sell the property or not, and had gone to Mr. Wulfenstein to negotiate different terms. No different terms
were ever agreed upon and the option was never altered,
and the option as signed is the one that was introduced
into evidence.
The fact that Mr. Larson had the option from
March, 1971 until the time of the initiating of this law
suit after the exercise of the option, without making any
complaint as to the purported improper f illing-in of the
blanks, seems very significant to us, and we believe was
of importance in the mind of the trial Judge in making
his decision. The trial Judge had the opportunity of seeing Mr. Larson, observing his demeanor and hearing his
testimony and drawing conclusions from such, a province which this court does not have. Even with the dry
record of the transcript, it shows clearly that it was not
until Christmas that Mr. Larson discussed with Mr.
Wulfenstein a possible different method of payment for
the property, rather than the $10,000.00 at the time of
the exercise of the option.
There are contradictions in the testimony of Mr.
Larson at page 77 of the record, wherein he states that
13
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he went to Mr. Wulfenstein's home about Christmas
time, and that he discussed a different method of payment and was first assured that he could have his money
any way he wanted it, but when defendants' counsel
asked him whether or not Mr. Wulf enstein had said that
he could have the 29% down, Mr. Larson then said that
Mr. Wulfenstein said no, that he didn't say that. H e
then stated that he made no effort after the signing of
the option in March until that Christmas to discuss any
alteration in the terms of the option.
The items which they contend were filled in contrary to instructions are
(a) The utilization of Southern Utah Title Company as the escrow agent, though no other escrow
agent was ever named, designated or even represented to be desired by the defendants; and
(b) As to the $10,000.00 down and the annual
$10,000.00 payments plus interest.
The testimony of Mr. Howard H . Carter and the testimony of Mr. Wulfenstein were that the blanks had been
filled in completely prior to the time of the presentation
of the document to the Larsons for signature in March
of 1971. Mr. Carter is the manager of Southern Utah
Title Company and he is the one who typed up the option on the printed form prior to its submission to the
Larsons, and also he is the one who notarized the document and talked with the Larsons by telephone immediately following the signing of the same. Also he is the
14
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one that transmitted by mail the copy of the document
to the Larsons. Perhaps we should review the contention that the document is void because the blanks were
filled in, in light of the Utah law relating to the same.
(It is not conceded that the blanks were in existence at
the time of signing, but assuming such for the purpose
of this argument only.) This court has decided that if a
document is signed in blank and the blanks are filled in
in pursuance of the instructions, that no prejudice results to any party and that such does not make the document void. This general principle is reaffirmed in the
E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. Broderick (supra). There it was stated that parol evidence
may be received to clarify ambiguous language in a contract, to show what the agreement was relative to filling
in blanks and to supply omitted terms which were
agreed upon but inadvertently left out of the written
agreement. The case of Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden
Theater Co., Inc., 83 Utah 279,17 P . 2d 294 is cited. In
our present case the defendants merely contend that
these were blank, and do not attempt to explain that
they should have been filled out with different terms. I t
was not until nine months later, namely Christmas of
1971, that Mr. Larson stated that he wanted 29% down.
Apparently they would have the court believe that the
method of payment for the property was never discussed except in generalities, and that they signed the
contract giving the option of purchase without any specification as to the method of payment. The document
in its printed form clearly calls for an escrow agent and
15
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for the payment of the money to the escrow agent and
disbursement by that escrow agent, and yet the defendants have not suggested any other company to act as the
escrow agent, or that there was any agreement that
some other company should act as an escrow agent.
Certainly in the interest of a completed contract the
logic is absolutely on the side of the plaintiffs that the
identity of the escrow agent be named and that the
method of making the payments upon exercise of the
option be named. In the Strout Western Realty Agency
v. Broderick case, supra, the court found that even
though some items on the back of the agreement were
blank, that such was not fatal to the basic concept in that
case that if there was a sale of the property a commission
was to be paid to the realtor. Likewise, in our present
case the court in the trial of the matter found that there
was a completed document, that the blanks had been
filled in prior to the signing, and that this was the agreement of the parties. As has been said many times before,
the advantageous position of the trial judge will be
honored by this court when the trial judge has seen the
demeanor of the witnesses, heard their testimony and
been able to reach the findings, conclusions and decree
based upon such. The judgment of the trial court in
matters of this nature will not be overturned by this
court unless there is a clear error and unless there are
matters in evidence that undeniably require a different
conclusion by the trial judge. Such is not the circumstance in this case.
16
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The document was completed, according to the
testimony of two of the witnesses, prior to the time of
signing. The variances in the darkness of the type in
parts of the document, which defendant asserts is proof
that the matter was typed in at a later date, were fully
explained by Mr. Carter, in that he frequently takes
documents out of his typewriter as he goes along and as
information comes to him, and replaces them with
others, and then puts the original one back in to complete his typing, and that nevertheless he was certain
that all of the blanks were completed prior to the time
that it was given to Mr. Wulfenstein to take out for the
signature by the Larsons in March of 1971.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of the present case is to require the
defendants, Larsons, to complete their agreement to sell
the ranch for $100,000.00. Specific performance was
decreed by the Court and plaintiffs stand ready and
willing to perform. The $500.00 for the option has been
retained by the defendants and the $10,000.00 is still in
the hands of the designated escrow agent.
W e urge that the decision of the trial Court be affirmed. The defendants will have the benefit of their
bargain, namely $100,000.00, and the plaintiffs will be
allowed to acquire title. The trial Court has carefully
weighed the evidence and issued his Memorandum De17
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cision, and then caused the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment to be made and entered. Such is in harmony
with the relevant laws, decisions and rules of equity.
Respectfully submitted,
P U G S L E Y , H A Y E S , WASKISS,
CAMPBELL & COWLEY
By Harry D. Pugsley
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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